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Chapter 4
Date Rape: The Intractability 
of Hermeneutical Injustice
Debra L. Jackson
Abstract Social epistemologists use the term hermeneutical injustice to refer to a 
form of epistemic injustice in which a structural prejudice in the economy of collec-
tive interpretive resources results in a person’s inability to understand his/her/their 
own social experience (Fricker M, Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of 
knowing. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; Medina J, Varieties of hermeneu-
tical injustice, In: Kidd IJ, Medina J, Pohlhaus G Jr, The Routledge handbook of 
epistemic injustice, Routledge, New York, p 41–52, 2017). This essay argues that 
the phenomenon of unacknowledged date rapes, that is, when a person experiences 
sexual assault yet does not conceptualize him/her/their self as a rape victim, should 
be regarded as a form of hermeneutical injustice. The fact that the concept of date 
rape has been widely used for at least three decades indicates the intractability of 
hermeneutical injustices of this sort and the challenges with its overcoming.
In 1988, journalist Robin Warshaw published I Never Called it Rape: The Ms. 
Report on Recognizing, Fighting, and Surviving Date and Acquaintance Rape. The 
book combined Warshaw’s own interviews of victims with data from the first large- 
scale nationwide scientific study of sexual assault in the United States. Sponsored 
by Ms. Magazine and coordinated by psychologist Mary Koss, the 3-year study of 
6159 students at 32 college campuses exposed the prevalence of rape committed by 
dates and acquaintances, finding that 1 in 4 women respondents had experienced 
rape or attempted rape, 84% of victims knew their attackers, and 57% of the rapes 
occurred during dates (Warshaw 1988, 11). The title of Warshaw’s book references 
the additional finding that only 27% of the women whose sexual assault met the 
legal definition of rape identified their experience as such (Warshaw 1988, 26). In 
the book’s introduction, Warshaw reveals that even she was unable to recognize 
herself as a victim of date rape until 3 years after the event.
Just a few years earlier, in 1985, Koss introduced the term unacknowledged rape 
victim to characterize “a woman who has experienced sexual assault that would 
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legally qualify as rape but who does not conceptualize herself as a rape victim” 
(Koss 1985, 195). In a survey of 2016 women, she found that 43% qualified as 
unacknowledged rape victims, and of those, 76% were romantically involved with 
their attackers (Koss 1985, 197). This paper argues that a woman’s inability to name 
her experiences of date rape as such can be understood as a hermeneutical injustice, 
that is, a form of epistemic injustice in which a structural prejudice in the economy 
of collective interpretive resources results in a person’s inability to understand their 
own social experience. I further argue that although feminist activists introduced the 
term date rape, as well as the related terms acquaintance rape and marital rape, as 
a means to correct this hermeneutical injustice and recognize what were previously 
unrecognizable crimes, women’s continuing resistance to naming themselves as 
rape victims demonstrates the intractability of this form of hermeneutical injustice.
4.1  The Invisibility of Date Rape
In her 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Miranda 
Fricker focuses on two forms of epistemic injustice, namely testimonial injustice 
and hermeneutical injustice. Although she devotes most of the book to testimonial 
injustice, a more widely discussed epistemic harm which “occurs when prejudice 
causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word,” she also 
describes hermeneutical injustice, a more recently recognized epistemic harm 
which “occurs when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an 
unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” 
(Fricker 2007, 1).
In the latter case, a person is unable to recognize their experience of a phenom-
enon for what it is, because there is no concept of that particular phenomenon. 
Fricker emphasizes that hermeneutical injustice is not simply a result of bad luck; it 
is a result of systematic prejudice. It is not an accident that members of socially and 
politically marginalized groups lack the tools to understand and communicate their 
own experiences. This lack is a product of epistemic marginalization insofar as they 
are denied the epistemic authority to contribute toward and influence the body of 
accepted and acceptable interpretive resources.
The most powerful example of hermeneutical injustice provided by Fricker 
recounts a story about Carmita Wood from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir, In Our 
Time: Memoir of a Revolution (1990). Ms. Wood had worked at Cornell University 
for 8 years, and during that time she endured unwanted attention from a male faculty 
member. This attention included him jiggling his crotch when he stood near her desk, 
brushing against her breasts when reaching for papers, and cornering her in an eleva-
tor to kiss her. Unable to avoid his behavior, Wood suffered stress and physical ail-
ments such as chronic back pain and neck pain. She eventually left her position, but 
when she applied for unemployment insurance, she was unable to justify her resigna-
tion. The claims investigator listed “personal reasons” as the explanation for her 
departure, and she was subsequently denied unemployment benefits. Fricker charac-
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terizes this as an example of hermeneutical injustice. Because this episode occurred 
prior to 1975, Wood was unable to identify her experience as the form of sex dis-
crimination that we now call sexual harassment. As a result, she suffers not only the 
harms of the humiliation of enduring the sexually discriminatory behavior, the physi-
cal ailments produced by the hostile work environment, and the loss of income and 
unemployment benefits from the lack of workplace protections, but also the epis-
temic harm of being unable to understand and articulate what had happened to her.
Crucially, Wood’s lack of the interpretive resources necessary to understand her 
own social experience is a predictable result of the social and political marginaliza-
tion of the social group to which she belongs. Without the concept of sexual harass-
ment, both Wood and the male faculty member are at an epistemic disadvantage. 
Neither of them has the interpretive tools to understand the dynamics of their situa-
tion. However, it is Wood, not the male faculty member, who suffers an injustice. 
The gap in hermeneutical resources benefits him insofar as it is produced by and 
reinforces his male privilege, while for Wood the gap is produced by and reinforces 
her subordination.
Philosopher Charles Mills explains, “[This situation] is not a matter of an inno-
cent misunderstanding or gap, but of a misrepresentation generated organically, 
materially, from the male perspective on the world, motivated by their group inter-
ests and phenomenologically supported by their group experience” (Mills 2017, 
105). Wood’s lack of the epistemic resources to name the discrimination she experi-
ences interferes with her ability to protest it and to enlist the help of others to over-
come it. Further, it is this conceptual lack that reinforces the professor’s male 
privilege in the professional academic environment.
Fricker’s example of sexual harassment is useful for understanding how women’s 
experiences of date rape qualify as hermeneutical injustices. Like the term sexual 
harassment, the term date rape is also one that did not exist prior to 1975, although 
the phenomenon we would now recognize as date rape undoubtedly existed. As 
early as 1957, sociologist Eugene J. Kanin conducted a series of studies on “male 
sex aggression in dating-courtship relationships,” but he did not identify this behav-
ior as a form of rape (Kirkpatrick and Kanin 1957; Kanin 1957, 1965, 1967, 1969, 
1971). Instead, he writes, “these aggressive acts…represent a sex- conduct norm vio-
lation not ordinarily anticipated during the course of heterosexual interaction to be 
considered ‘normal’ or expected, and yet the expression of physical aggression 
manifested in trying to gain the erotic goal, coitus, is usually not so extreme that 
these acts could be labeled carnal assault or attempted rape” (Kanin 1967, 428).
Kanin’s view that “male sex aggression in dating-courtship relationships” does 
not qualify as rape was in line with prevailing legal statutes and social attitudes. At 
the mid-twentieth century, rape referred to sexual intercourse committed by a man 
upon a woman, not his wife, using force and against her will (American Law 
Institute 1985, §213.1). Notably, consent could serve as a defense to the charge of 
rape, even with the presence of force or the threat of force. In addition, if the woman 
was a “voluntary social companion” of the man who assaulted her, the offense was 
downgraded (American Law Institute 1985, §213.1). In other words, the term rape 
was reserved for incidents in which a victim was sexually assaulted by a stranger.
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It is understandable, then, why women who were sexually assaulted by men they 
were dating would not be viewed as, nor would they view themselves as, victims of 
rape. Because the concept of rape excluded incidents of sexual assault occurring 
between people who were acquainted with each other, those who experienced what 
we would now identify as date rape were unable to understand their experience as 
rape. As a result, those who were sexually victimized by someone they were dating 
faced a hermeneutical injustice in addition to the harm they experienced from the 
sexual assault.
Without the concept of date rape, it is not only the victim who lacks the ability 
to understand the encounter for what it is; the perpetrator, as well as scholars such 
as Kanin and the wider public, lack the ability to understand “male sex aggression 
in dating-courtship relationships” as rape. Nevertheless, it is the victim who suffers 
a hermeneutical injustice. A woman’s inability to understand her experiences of 
gender-based violence is a product of the social and political marginalization of 
women with respect to men. As Susan Brownmiller famously states, rape is “a con-
scious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear” 
(Brownmiller 1975, 15). To understand this, consider the history of the term rape 
and its role in preserving the authority of men over women. In early Roman law, 
raptus, the Latin word from which the modern term rape derives, referred to the 
abduction or kidnapping of a woman by force, not necessarily a sexual offense 
(Burgess-Jackson 1999, 16).
That is, the crime of raptus was a crime of theft, the forcible taking of a man’s 
property. Under this view, it is the household that is damaged, not the woman. Later, 
when raptus was considered a sexual offense, the crime was still considered a viola-
tion a man’s property rights: the crime could often be forgiven if the “abductor” 
married the woman he “abducted” since marriage would transfer the status of her as 
the property of her father to the property of the offender. Moreover, the woman who 
was “abducted” could be punished along with the offender if she was found to have 
cooperated with him (Burgess-Jackson 1999, 16).
The idea that rape was an offense against a person was first introduced in the late 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, but the older view of rape as a property crime still 
played an influential role within the collective hermeneutical resources. Certain 
men could not be conceptualized as rapists and certain women could not be concep-
tualized as victims. For example, laws against rape did not criminalize the rape of a 
wife, a slave, or a prostitute. The reasoning for these exceptions reflected women’s 
lack of a right to bodily integrity: a wife, as the property of her husband, could not 
be raped by him since a person cannot violate his own property rights; a female 
slave, as the property of her slave owner, also could not be raped by him because she 
is his property; and, a prostitute, as the property of no one, could not be a victim of 
rape since there are no property rights to be violated. Restricting the class of actions 
that qualify as rape thus allows for the policing of cross-racial and cross-class rela-
tionships while still preserving intra-racial and intra-class access to women’s 
bodies.
Without the term date rape to understand her social experience, a woman who is 
sexually assaulted by a man she is dating endures hermeneutical injustice. She is not 
D. L. Jackson
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
only harmed physically and emotionally by the sexual violence, she is also harmed 
in her capacity as a knower. Her cognitive disablement prevents her from under-
standing her experience as a form of sexual assault deserving redress. Instead, she 
may interpret her suffering as illegitimate or self-caused. If she has an ongoing 
relationship with her attacker, she may be exposed to recurring episodes of sexual 
violence, which she will also be unable to identify as such. Moreover, without the 
ability to name herself as a victim, she will not view law enforcement, medical per-
sonnel, and social services as resources available to assist her. She will be deeply 
confused about her experience and left to cope with her feelings in isolation.
4.2  The Recognition of Date Rape
At this point in history we can recognize the hermeneutical injustice suffered by 
Carmita Wood because we now have the concept that refers to the phenomenon that 
she experienced. Once the lacuna in interpretive resources is filled, the hermeneuti-
cal injustices of the past can be retroactively recognized. Without that concept, she 
and others in similar circumstances would continue to suffer from hermeneutical 
injustice. One would predict, then, that we could witness hermeneutical injustices 
receding with the introduction of the new concept. The addition of that concept to 
the collective interpretive resources should allow for people in the present and 
future to leverage it to understand their own social experiences. However, while this 
has occurred in the case of sexual harassment, the overcoming of hermeneutical 
injustice with respect to date rape has not been as successful.
According to Brownmiller, the term sexual harassment was coined in 1975. She 
credits this to a group of eight women from Cornell University’s Human Affairs 
Office who, in a discussion of the similarities between Wood’s experience and that 
of others they knew, wondered how to best to refer to the phenomenon. They consid-
ered the terms sexual intimidation, sexual coercion, and sexual exploitation on the 
job, before finally landing on the term sexual harassment (Brownmiller 1999, 281).
A few years later, legal scholar Catharine A. MacKinnon called for recognition 
of sexual harassment as a punishable offense. In her 1979 book, Sexual Harassment 
of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination., she identified sexual harassment 
as a form of sex discrimination, and distinguished between two forms of sexual 
harassment, quid pro quo and hostile working environment. MacKinnon applied her 
argument when serving as co-counsel for the respondent in the 1986 Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson case. The Supreme Court agreed with her, recognizing sex-
ual harassment as a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Armed 
with a concept to understand their experience and an awareness of the law’s willing-
ness to redress the harm, victims began to speak out. Following the Meritor deci-
sion, the number of sexual harassment cases reported to the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission rose from 10 annually to 624 in 1986, 2217 in 1990, and 
4626 in 1995 (Cochran 2004, 168). Five years after the Meritor decision, another 
case of sexual harassment garnered widespread influence. In 1991, attorney Anita 
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Hill testified against Supreme Court justice nominee Clarence Thomas, a man who 
had served as her supervisor at the United States Department of Education and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Although her testimony did not prevent his appointment, the publicity of the 
event encouraged victims to recognize themselves as such and report the discrimi-
nation they faced. In the years following the hearings, the number of sexual harass-
ment cases reported to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission combined 
with those filed with state fair employment practice agencies rose from 6883  in 
1991 to 15,618 in 1998 (U.S. EEOC 2010, 1).
Like the term sexual harassment, the term date rape first appeared in 1975: Susan 
Brownmiller used the term in her groundbreaking book, Against Our Will: Men, 
Women, and Rape. In the few pages she dedicates to addressing date rape, 
Brownmiller notes that in the context of a dating relationship, coercive power oper-
ates through gendered social expectations, often requiring less physical force than is 
often assumed to be present in sexual assault cases. She writes, “In a dating situation 
an aggressor may press his advantage to the point where pleasantness quickly turns 
to unpleasantness and more than the woman bargained for, yet social propriety and 
the strictures of conventional female behavior that dictate politeness and femininity 
demand that the female gracefully endure, or wriggle away if she can, but a direct 
confrontation falls outside of the behavioral norms” (Brownmiller 1975, 257).
Because women are socialized to be emotional caretakers and “ladylike,” a 
woman is less likely to actively resist an attacker known to her. Instead, she may 
employ passive resistance strategies and hope that her date doesn’t increase his 
aggression. However, without active resistance, courts are more likely to view her 
as having consented to the encounter, and knowing this, she will be reluctant to 
report the incident or identify herself as a victim of rape.
In her memoir, In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution, Brownmiller traces the 
development of her views on rape back to her involvement with the New  York 
Radical Feminists. Under the slogan “Rape Is a Political Crime Against Women,” 
the group held the first public speak-out on rape on January 24, 1971, during which 
30 women testified to a crowd of over 300 women about their experiences with 
sexual violence perpetrated by strangers, acquaintances, and dates (Brownmiller 
1999, 199). Through grassroots efforts over the following decades, the feminist 
movement’s attention to violence against women brought about several reforms to 
rape law, including the introduction of the concepts date rape, acquaintance rape, 
and marital rape to scholarly and public discourse.
By 1984, journalists and scholars, including Eugene Kanin (1984, 1985), started 
using the term date rape and counting sexual assault committed in the context of 
dating relationships as genuine instances of rape. At the same time, many believed 
that rape, particularly those involving intimates, was one of the most underreported 
crimes. Thus, many scholars understood that they could not rely on the numbers of 
victims who utilize rape crisis centers or turn to law enforcement agencies to gain 
an accurate picture of the prevalence of sexual violence.
In her investigation of these “hidden rapes,” Mary Koss did not only eschew 
reports to law enforcement and rape crisis centers as a source of accurate statistics, 
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she also questioned the use of self-report surveys for determining the prevalence of 
rape. She cautioned that surveys which use the expression rape victim may be unre-
liable since they would miss the class of victims she labels as unacknowledged rape 
victims, that is, women whose experience would legally qualify as rape, but do not 
conceptualize themselves as rape victims (Koss 1985, 195). For example, instead of 
asking women whether they had ever been raped, Koss asked whether they had ever 
had sexual intercourse when they didn’t want to because a man used force. This 
strategy of avoiding the terms rape and victim was central to the findings from the 
first large-scale scientific study of rape on college campuses sponsored by Ms. 
Magazine and coordinated by Koss.
Elaborating upon the results of this groundbreaking study, Robin Warshaw high-
lights how the interpretive framework women use to understand their experiences of 
sexual violence is often based upon a conceptualization of rape as a crime commit-
ted only by strangers. For example, about herself Warshaw writes, “Since my 
attacker had been my boyfriend, with whom I had had sexual intercourse before, I 
never attached the word “rape” to what had happened” (Warshaw 1988, 6). She also 
quotes other women who told her, “I was totally unaware that what he had done to 
me was a crime. I had no idea I could report it to the police” (Warshaw 1988, 32); 
and “I never told anyone I was raped. I would not have thought that was what it was” 
(Warshaw 1988, 120). Warshaw, like many other feminist thinkers, hoped that femi-
nist consciousness-raising efforts, rape awareness education campaigns, and 
feminist- informed scholarship could overcome this hermeneutical injustice faced 
by rape victims.
4.3  The Intractability of Date Rape
Unfortunately, the widespread usage of the term date rape, acquaintance rape, and 
marital rape throughout the 1980s and 1990s did not result in the elimination of 
women’s inability to name their experiences of sexual violence as rape. Over a 
decade after Warshaw’s book was published, and 25 years after Brownmiller intro-
duced the term date rape into public discourse, women who experience sexual vio-
lence in the context of dating relationships continue to be unable to recognize their 
experience as rape. In 2000, psychologist Lynn Phillips published Flirting with 
Danger: Young Women’s Reflections on Sexuality and Domination. Of the 30 women 
she interviewed, 27 described at least 1 encounter that fit the legal definition of rape, 
battering, or harassment, yet did not name that experience rape or abuse (Phillips 
2000, 7). In fact, these women explicitly resist naming themselves as victims. 
Consider the following four examples from her interviews with young women ages 
22, 22, 21, and 21, respectively.
It was violent and hurtful and really scary. But I don’t think I could ever call it rape. Let’s 
just say that things went badly. (Phillips 2000, 149)
I mostly think of it as a really bad night. If you’re asking do I think I was raped, no, I 
wouldn’t really call it that. I mean, I was forced, yes, and I was hurt, and things didn’t go 
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how I wanted, but I was in the car with him. It was all really complicated. I mean, I was 
there, I could have chosen not to go. So no, I don’t really call it rape. (Phillips 2000, 154)
It was like a kind of weird violent kind of thing. I don’t feel like I could have really said no. 
I don’t know if I necessarily would call it rape. But I would say that he was so strong and 
big and on top of me and it was like he was totally in control from the get go. Sometimes I 
think it was rape and sometimes I don’t know if it was rape. (Phillips 2000, 161–162)
I mean, I was crying and sort of pulling away, and hoping he’d notice I was upset and stop, 
but I didn’t exactly tell him no. I could have said, “Get the hell off me! I want to go home!” 
But I didn’t. I just laid there crying and hoping he’d stop. Maybe if I’d said something, who 
knows? Maybe things would have been different. But as it happened, I never exactly said no 
to him, so I really just have myself to blame. (Phillips 2000, 175)
These women describe the encounters as “violent,” “hurtful,” “really scary,” and 
“forced.” They describe their dates as being “so strong,” “on top of me,” and “totally 
in control.” They describe themselves as “hurt,” “crying,” “sort of pulling away,” 
and “unable to say no.” Yet, they resist naming the encounter as rape. Instead, they 
say that “things went badly;” they refer to the encounter as “a really bad night;” they 
describe the situation as “really complicated;” and they conclude that “I really just 
have myself to blame.”
To explain why women who endure rape often do not apply the term to their own 
experiences, philosopher Katherine Jenkins insists that the widespread acceptance 
of rape myths prevents the concept from genuinely being at a victim’s disposal. 
Common rape myths include beliefs such as “consent is automatically present if a 
prior consensual sexual act between the same parties recently took place,” and “rape 
is only committed by strangers and cannot occur within a marriage/a relationship/a 
friendship” (Jenkins 2017, 192). Employing Sally Haslanger’s (2012) distinction 
between manifest and operative concepts, Jenkins argues that unacknowledged rape 
victims suffer from hermeneutical injustice due to a conceptual lack. While the 
concepts may be manifest in legal statutes, they are not operative in legal and social 
practice. Instead, the operative concept is shaped by rape myths that are either 
explicitly or implicitly accepted in public discourse in general and by unacknowl-
edged rape victims in particular.
Jenkins points to a 2004 study by psychologists Zoe Peterson and Charlene 
Muehlenhard, which found that unacknowledged rape victims were more likely to 
accept rape myths and to have been victimized in ways that were consistent with 
those rape myths. When women resist labeling their experiences of sexual violence 
as rape, they do so because their working understanding of rape excludes their expe-
rience. That is, rape myths hinder the manifest concept from becoming operative. 
As a result, Jenkins argues, unacknowledged rape victims can be understood as 
lacking the conceptual resource necessary to make sense of their experience.
While Jenkins’ account of the role of rape myths in preventing some victims 
from being able to recognize their experiences of rape as such, it does not account 
for them all. Phillips found that the same women who call their own experiences 
“just a bad night” or “really complicated” were willing to use words like rape, bat-
tering, victimization, and abuse to describe other women’s experiences in similar 
circumstances. For example, when Phillips asked one 22-year old woman how she 
would define the experience if it had happened to a friend, she responded,
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Wow, that is so awesome! If my roommate came home and told me the exact same story had 
happened to her, I’d tell her, “You call the hotline, you call the police! You’re a victim! That 
guy raped you and you should report it!” Wow! But, I don’t know. For her it would be rape. 
For me is [sic] was just so complicated. (Phillips 2000, 154)
Similarly, a 21-year old woman admitted that she should label her experience as 
rape, but nevertheless resisted doing so.
I mean, consciously I know, and if I were examining other women’s experiences or some-
thing, and she said, “I went home with this guy and I didn’t want to have sex but he forced 
me or I was so intimidated that I just did,” I would say that’s rape. But I feel like I have 
another standard and I did internalize a lot of ideas that it was sort of my fault, and how can 
I say it’s rape when I went up there? You know, what was I expecting? (Phillips 2000, 155)
These interviews suggest that not only can we not explain women’s inability to 
name their experiences of rape as such as a result of a conceptual lack, since the 
concept of date rape has been developed and is present in policy and law, but we 
also cannot explain that inability as a result of lack of practical applicability of the 
concept of date rape, since the victims in question are able to apply the concept to 
other women’s experiences.
While Fricker and Jenkins describe hermeneutical injustice as a product of a 
conceptual lack, other philosophers such as Jose Medina argue that in pluralist soci-
eties there are often “diverse publics with heterogeneous interpretive resources and 
practices” (Medina 2013, 101), thus, one must attend to the ways in which compet-
ing interpretive resources can produce hermeneutical injustices. He writes, “When 
it comes to hermeneutical harms and injustices, the question is not simply whether 
or not there are expressive and interpretative resources available for meaning- 
making and meaning-sharing, but how those resources are used, by whom, and in 
what ways” (Medina 2017, 43). This description of hermeneutical injustice as a 
product of competing interpretive resources, rather than as only a result of a herme-
neutical incapacity, offers a powerful explanation for the intractability of hermeneu-
tical injustice with respect to date rape.
Consider, again, the testimonies from the young women in Phillips’ book. On the 
one hand, Phillips describes the young women in her study as having been clearly 
influenced by feminist sensibilities. She writes, “The participants spoke often and 
easily about feminist politics and gender, race, class, and sexual inequalities. They 
were outspoken about violence against women…. And all were able to critique the 
sexist (and often racist, classist, and heterosexist) images they encountered in their 
women’s magazines, in movies, and on TV” (Phillips 2000, 35).
It is this set of interpretive resources that women draw upon when characterizing 
other women’s experiences of sexual violence. Despite the influence of rape myths 
in their social landscape, they are able to make the manifest concepts in law and 
policy operative, at least with respect to other women. On the other hand, when 
describing their own experiences, the women express feelings of guilt and self- 
blame, which flatly contradict their conscious beliefs, values, and attitudes. The 
women emphasize what they did preceding the assault: “I was in the car with him;” 
“I was there;” and “how can I say it’s rape when I went up there?” They also empha-
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size what they didn’t do: “I could have chosen not to go;” “I never exactly said no 
to him;” and “I could have said, ‘Get the hell off me! I want to go home!’ But I 
didn’t.”
These reflections are offered as justification for their refusal to identify them-
selves as rape victims. Notice that the perpetrator’s actions are less relevant than the 
victim’s. Implicit in these testimonies is a narrow concept of victimization. Because 
the women exercise some modicum of agency, they cannot qualify as victims. To be 
considered a genuine victim, then, requires that they experience utter powerless-
ness, complete helplessness, and irrecoverable trauma.
4.4  Conclusion
Caught between two competing interpretive resources, the women interviewed by 
Phillips use one interpretive frame for understanding other women’s experiences, 
and use another frame for understanding their own. Faced with a choice between 
identifying as victims or blaming themselves, the latter often pays better dividends. 
While identifying as a victim normally allows one to claim the benefits of legal 
recourse and social sympathy, these benefits are all too often denied to victims of 
rape. When women report sexual victimization, their claims are rarely deemed cred-
ible and even rarer still do their assailants face legal consequences. Self-blame, on 
the other hand, invites a sense of agency and control, which is critical for someone 
who has been victimized.
In Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma, psychologist 
Ronnie Janoff-Bulman (1992) describes self-blame as a common adaptive strategy 
that functions to preserve three widely-accepted basic assumptions about ourselves 
and our world, namely that the world is benevolent, the world is meaningful, and the 
self is worthy. When a person survives a life-threatening event, these fundamental 
assumptions are challenged: perhaps the world is not a good place filled with good 
people; perhaps the world is not meaningful or sensical; perhaps I am not a person 
who deserves good things. Janoff-Bulman argues that self-blame reflects a person’s 
attempt to make sense of her victimization, that is, to answer the question, “Why 
me?” and to be able to proceed into the future with the hope that her future actions 
can help her avoid additional harm.
For many women, to identify oneself as a victim of date rape requires an ability 
to reconcile what appears to be a conceptual conflict: how can one exercise agency 
and yet be a victim? Reflecting on why so many women who endure date rape do 
not self-identify as victims, Warshaw writes,
Because of her personal relationship with the attacker, however casual, it often takes a 
woman longer to perceive an action as rape when it involves a man she knows than it does 
when a stranger assaults her. For her to acknowledge her experience as rape would be to 
recognize the extent to which her trust was violated and her ability to control her own life 
destroyed. Indeed, regardless of their age or background, many women interviewed for this 
book told no one about their rapes, never confronted their attackers, and never named their 
assaults as rape until months or years later. (Warshaw 1988, 26)
D. L. Jackson
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
It is instructive that some of these women eventually come to identify as rape 
victims, and that this revised interpretation of their experience is frequently influ-
enced by comparing their own experience to that of others. Describing her own 
realization that she was a victim of date rape, Warshaw writes, “one day, after a 
close friend became head of a local rape-crisis group, I was listening to her tell me 
about some of her group’s recent cases. They were all rapes committed by strangers, 
but the stories evoked a rush of feelings about my own experience. Then I knew: I 
had been raped” (Warshaw 1988, 6). That is, while having the concept as an avail-
able interpretive resource is useful, it is not always sufficient for motivating the 
choosing of one worldview over another. Being able to see oneself as one among 
many, who is empowered through empathy with others in similar circumstances, 
helps one understand one’s suffering not as an isolated incident, but as part of a 
larger social pathology that can be collectively resisted.
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